In the late 90s, Rivest's seminal paper introduced the concept of an All-Or-Nothing (AON) encryption: a method transforming input data into a ciphertext that can be decrypted only if it is complete. Therefore, when combined with data fragmentation and dispersal over multiple independent storage nodes, the AON processing protects against an attacker that possesses the right encryption key but is unable to gather all of the data fragments. Rivest's proposal comes at the cost of a significant decrease of performance as it requires at least two rounds of data encryption. Recently, a new scheme named Bastion was introduced. It protects fragmented data against key exposure using only a single round of data encryption combined with a post-processing linear transform. This makes it significantly faster than the Rivest's method. In this paper, we make three advancements in the state-of-the-art. First, we formulate a new security model, in which the security of an all-or-nothing method depends not on the amount of data acquired by the attacker but on the number of compromised storage nodes. Second, we introduce the Circular All-Or-Nothing (CAON) algorithm. It transforms, fragments, and disperses data in a way that the information is protected unless all of the storage nodes are compromised. In comparison to the Bastion scheme, it reduces the number of exclusive-or operations made in addition to encryption by almost a half. We believe that CAON can be integrated inside modern distributed storage systems or multi-cloud data solutions in order to reinforce the confidentiality level of the stored data at the cost of a very small, almost negligible, performance overhead. Last but not least, for both CAON and Bastion, we provide security properties that are easy to formalize under standard cryptographic hypotheses.
Introduction
The rapid growth of the cloud data storage market raises both security challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, cloud providers deal with a large number of external attacks on a daily basis. Each major data leak is loudly reported in the media, damaging their reputation. On top of that, the threat may not only come from the outside, but also from a curious, malicious, or careless insider. On the other hand, never before could users access to so many machines at such a low cost. This highly distributed nature of the cloud storage opens up new possibilities for strengthening data protection: data can be fragmented and dispersed over a large number of servers on independent sites [2, 4, 7] . Such processing not only slows down an external attacker, but also enhances users' privacy against misusing personal data (see the infamous Facebook and Cambridge Analytica case 1 ), as it clearly limits the possibility of data exploiting.
Encrypting, fragmenting, and dispersing data over different locations is a proven way of reinforcing data confidentiality, integrity, and availability [14] . The most common way of data fragmentation consists in segmenting data into chunks containing consecutive data bytes. However, such straightforward data fragmentation is insufficient against powerful adversaries being in possession of encryption keys and able to access a subset of the storage domains (and thus a subset of data fragments that they can decrypt). Indeed, key exposure is a real threat. It may be a result of an easily guessable or reproducible key generation, but even relying on secure mechanisms may not be sufficient as a secure key may be acquired in various ways, e.g., using backdoors, bribe, or coercion [11] . In order to prevent an attacker in possession of the encryption key from decrypting even a part of a fragmented and dispersed ciphertext, an all-or-nothing transform can be applied before [19] or after [11] data encryption. Alternatively, an information dispersal algorithm can be used to form the final fragments by shredding and encoding encrypted data [15] . These two methods reinforce data protection but come at a certain cost. An all-or-nothing transform leads to a decrease of performance as it requires additional data processing than just encrypting. On the other hand, information dispersal lacks of scalability.
In this paper, we revisit the all-or-nothing methodology. First, we introduce a new security model for data protection against key exposure that, in contrary to other models, defines the security of an all-or-nothing scheme in terms of the number of locations compromised by an attacker and not the amount of ciphertext blocks acquired by them. Second, we introduce a fast all-or-nothing scheme for protecting outsourced data against key exposure. It achieves the lowest performance overhead among all-or-nothing schemes aiming at protecting data against key exposure. Third, we formulate security assumptions about the pseudo-randomness of a ciphertext in a situation of key exposure.
Outline In Section 2 we introduce data concepts used during the schemes descriptions. In Section 3, we present related work from the domain of data fragmentation. In Section 4, we present the new security model determining security in terms of number of compromised storage locations and not acquired ciphertext blocks. In Section 5, we introduce a new all-or-nothing scheme and compare it with relevant work. In Section 6, we describe similarities between CAON and Bastion's scheme and in Section 7 we compare CAON with relevant AONs. In Section 8, a first approach to the security analysis of the CAON scheme is presented. In Section 9 this analysis is extended. In Section 10, we study various possible improvements to CAON to rely on more relaxed (and easier to formulate) and/or, from our point of view, more commonly accepted cryptographic hypotheses. The paper ends with an insight into future work.
Data Concepts
We identify the following basic data structures that mostly correspond to the classical concepts concerning a symmetric block cipher [6] :
• Block (B, P , or C): a sequence of bits of size |B| corresponding to the classical concept of block. When referring to a plaintext block, the block is denoted as P , and when referring to a ciphertext the block is denoted as C. When a block can be a plaintext or a ciphertext it is simply denoted as B.
• Transformed ciphertext block (C ): when an all-or-nothing transform was applied to a bloc C (in a post-processing step after encryption) the transformed block is denoted as C .
• Transformed block (B ): when an all-or-nothing transform was applied to a block B (in a pre-processing step before encryption), the transformed block it is denoted as B .
• Plaintext (P LAIN ): initial data composed of p plaintext blocks (already padded if needed).
• Ciphertext (CIP H): encrypted plaintext composed of c ciphertext blocks. c = p + 1 as an initialization vector is added at the beginning of the ciphertext.
• Transformed ciphertext (CIP H ): the ciphertext CIP H after being transformed using a post-processing all-or-nothing transform.
• Fragment (F ): a fragment, the result of the final fragmentation step. Each fragment is usually composed of c k blocks (when data is distributed over fragments in an uniform way). In the literature, fragments are sometimes denoted as shares especially in the context of perfect or computational secret sharing.
Related work
This section presents state-of-the-art fragmentation methods that aim at reinforcing data confidentiality and can be used to slow down attackers possessing encryption keys but unable to gather all of the data fragments.
Perfect secret sharing
Perfect (or information-theoretically secure) secret sharing fragments data into n fragments, k of which are needed for data reconstruction [3, 20] . Less than k fragments provide no information whatsoever about the initial data. Therefore, such way of data fragmentation resists even the most powerful attacker (in terms of the computation power) that is not able to compromise the required threshold of sites storing the data fragments. However, the strong security of the perfect secret sharing comes at the cost of a n-fold increase in the volume of the data to be stored as each of the fragments is of the size of the data itself. This makes it too unpractical to be applied for protection of larger data.
Computational secret sharing
Krawczyk's Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS) fragments encrypted data using Rabin's Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [15] in n fragments, k of which are needed for data reconstruction. The encryption key is fragmented into n fragments using a perfect secret sharing scheme (usually the Shamir's scheme [20] ) and attached within data fragments. Unlike perfect secret sharing, the method does not lead to a huge increase of storage volume (the only overhead comes from the perfect secret sharing of the small encryption key). However, it lacks of scalability -the performance of the scheme significantly decreases with the number of fragments. SSMS protects data against an attacker that acquired the encryption key but was unable to gather at least k of the data fragments. However, unlike AONs, it does not protect against a chosen plaintext attack.
All-or-nothing schemes
During descriptions, we consider the all-or-nothing transform (AONT) as the pre-or post-processing step applied before data encryption in order to make it resistant against key exposure. We denote as an all-or-nothing (AON) the complete two-step process: of data encryption and of data pre-or post-processing transformation using an AONT.
Rivest's and Desai's AON
The concept of an AONT was first introduced by Rivest at the beginning of the 90s [18] . In Rivest's proposal, p input blocks are transformed into c = p + 1 output blocks. First, each input block Bi is encrypted using a random key K rand : B i = Bi ⊕ E(K rand , i) where 1 ≤ i ≤ p (E is a symmetric encryption function). Second, a hash of each output block is computed: Hi = hash(K pub , B i ⊕ i) where 1 ≤ i ≤ p, using a publicly known key K pub (hash is a keyed hash function). Third, an additional output block is computed as an exclusive-or of K rand and of all hashes:
Hi. Such pre-processed data is then ready to be encrypted. In [5] , Desai proposed a faster version of the Rivest's AONT where the block cipher round which uses K pub is skipped and the additional output block is set to B c = K ⊕ p 1 B i . Both, Rivest's and Desai's AONs protect against the exposure of the encryption key. However, this protection comes at a high performance cost as it requires two rounds of encryption. Therefore, modern distributed storage systems such as IBM Cloud Object Storage 2 [16] apply only the pre-processing AONT step to their data, losing the property of protection against key exposure.
Bastion
Recently introduced, Bastion [11] is an AON that requires just a single round of data encryption and a postprocessing AONT. Thanks to a wise implementation, the transform applied after the encryption uses only 2c exclusive-or operations (3c − 1 exclusive-ors are made in total, counting c − 1 exclusive-ors from the CTR mode). Bastion's scheme is described in detail in Section 6 as it will be compared to the CAON.
Mix&Slice
Mix&Slice [1] is an approach to enforce access revocation on data stored at external cloud providers. Dependencies are created inside encrypted data, so re-encrypting even a small portion of the outsourced data with a fresh key revokes the access to a user who does not possess the new key. The algorithm used for the data transformation could be seen as a particular case of an all-or-nothing scheme, as it is characterized by the same property: data decryption is not possible without the possession of the whole ciphertext. In Mix&Slice, the transformation into final output messages is performed using multiple encryption rounds -each encryption round re-encrypts (and thus creates dependencies between) a different subset of the input data.
Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal
The secure fragmentation and dispersal scheme [8] is not an all-or-nothing method but a way of ciphertext dispersing aiming at reinforcing data confidentiality. It separates consecutive blocks of a ciphertext, as well as consecutive bits of ciphertext blocks, over different fragments dispersed over independent storage locations. Consequently, an attacker present in a single storage location is unable to decrypt a single fragment even if they possess the encryption key. The drawback of the solution is that it is efficient only when applied to ciphertexts obtained with modes of operation using chaining between blocks (like Cipher Block Chaining). Contrary to AON schemes, it does not resist a chosen plaintext attack.
A new security model
Bastion scheme was the first all-or-nothing method relaxing the security (it protects the ciphertext unless all but two blocks are acquired and not like in Rivest's proposal unless all but one) in order to gain in performance. In this section, we introduce the (k − λ ) fragments -Ciphertext Access under Key Exposure (CAKE) property that is clearly inspired by the (c − λ) blocks -CAKE security property presented in Bastion. The big picture is that both Bastion and CAON aim at protecting encrypted data against a chosen plaintext attack in a situation when the attacker acquired the encryption key and a big part (but not the totality) of the ciphertext. However, it is assumed that the Initialization Vector C0 used during the encryption is not given to the attacker (same assumption is done in the Bastion's proposal).
The difference between the two schemes lies in the attacker model. On the one hand, in the Bastion's blocks CAKE security model represents an adversary A that can obtain up to (c − λ) ciphertext blocks. On the other hand, CAON's CAKE security models an adversary that is able to obtain (k − λ ) data fragments. This change in the security model was motivated by the fact that once an attacker manages to compromise a storage node, they are most probably able to acquire a whole data fragment. A situation where the attacker can obtain only some blocks of a fragment (i.e. in a situation of memory leak) but not the whole fragment can be imagined, but is relatively rare.
In our attacker model we consider an attacker that would like to access the stored information. We do not consider an attacker that would like to destroy the data as it is clear that an all-or-nothing approach is incompatible with data resilience. However, it is possible to add resilience to the fragmented data by i.e. applying Reed-Solomon error-correction codes (such combination was already introduced in the literature as AONT-RS [17] .
(k − λ ) fragments -CAKE Security
We allow the polynomial adversary A to have access at any time (A is "adaptative") to an encryption/decryption black box that encrypts messages of A's choice using the blockcipher BC used by the instantiation of CAON considered (the same from the beginning, publicly known etc.). And likewise A also has access to the inverse BC −1 . This is a strong difference with the usual case and models the fact that, here, A knows the key of BC. Of course, we will constantly assume that A can also perform the invertible linear transformation step, which is a publicly known feature of the scheme. As will become clear in the game below, A will be allowed to learn all but λ fragments of the ciphertext (and not λ blocks like in Bastion). Confidentiality with λ = 0 is clearly not achievable (any part with access to all fragments and the encryption key can recover the plaintext), we seek an encryption mode where λ = 1. Similar to [11] , we specify a block length |B|.
Here is the -so called "CAKE" -game between A and an oracle O, that defines ind-CPA security in this context, where we allowed ourselves to shift to a presentation more similar to [12, p. 74]:
1. A has access to BC, BC −1 and outputs to O a pair of plaintext P LAIN 0 and P LAIN 1 of the same length.
2. O chooses a bit a ∈ 0, 1.
O chooses an initialization vector C0 at random and performs CAON to give A the fragmentation results for the chosen P LAIN
The adversary A chooses the k − 1 fragments she wants to obtain from O. O gives them to A.
5.
A outputs to O a bit a .
6. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if a = a and 0 otherwise. In the former case, we say that A succeeds.
Circular All-Or-Nothing
The CAON scheme was already briefly described in a three pages poster [10] and in a chapter of a thesis [9] . here, we present a detailed description of the scheme. CAON transforms a plaintext into k fragments (using a combination of encryption, linear transform, and dispersal), which are typically distributed to k independent storage locations. Its security objective is to make that the plaintext is protected against the exposure of the encryption key unless all of the fragments have been gathered.
Algorithm Description
We consider a "blockcipher" BC, which is a function operating on blocks of size |B| bits (typically 128) and which outputs |B| bits. We note + or ⊕ the XOR operation between two blocs : i.e. the sum of binary vectors in F |B| 2 . We will sometimes add a vector with a number i (typically the counter of CTR mode). By this abuse of notation we simply mean the binary writing of the number i, seen as a vector in F |B| 2 . BC has been obtained by choosing a set of keyed pseudo-random functions ([12, def 3.25]), then sampling a particular key. BC is assumed fixed from now on and publicly known: as will be obvious, this translates the situation where an attacker learned the key. Furthermore, BC is assumed to be invertible with a publicly known and efficiently computable inverse BC −1 (this assumption will be discussed later). We start from a plaintext P LAIN = [P1, . . . , Pp] of p blocks.
• (Encryption) In a first step, an initialization bloc C0 is uniformly chosen. P LAIN is then encrypted using a blockcipher BC in Counter Mode CT R of operation, starting from C0. For the sake of completeness, let us just remind that it consists to one-time pad the vector [0, P LAIN ] ∈ (F |B| 2 ) p+1 (the P LAIN concatenated with a zero block on the left) with a hopefully -to be discussed-pseudo random vector
• (Linear Transform) An invertible linear transform is applied to the ciphertext CIP H transforming it into CIP H (the pseudo-code of the transform is presented in Figure 1 ). The processing is done block by block starting from the last block Cp. Firstly, for each i ≥ 1, each ciphertext block Ci is transformed into C i := Ci + Ci−1. Finally, the first block C0 being a sensible block -because, if revealed, it allows to reverse the chaining processing-it is then summed with k − 1 particular -already transformed-special blocks:
The indices i1, . . . , i k−1 are chosen (i) with gaps at least 1 between them, (ii) and such that, in the next step, the k blocks C 0 , C i 1 , . . . , C i k−1 all end up in k pairwise different fragments. (It may be important to mention that special blocks were not proposed in the first CAON description [10] . They are a modification of the initial scheme.)
• (Dispersion) Blocks of the transformed ciphertext CIP H are grouped in k fragments F0, . . . , F k−1 . The pseudo-code of the dispersal function is presented in Figure 3 . The procedure follows one rule: consecutive blocks of the transformed ciphertext are dispersed over different fragments.
for each i = c − 1, . . . , 1 do 3:
First block: Figure 1 : Pseudo-code of the linear transform creating dependencies between consecutive blocks of the ciphertext and between the first block C 0 and k − 1 already transformed blocks that will be later dispersed over different fragments (here we choose the k − 1 special blocks with indices i j , chosen (i) with gaps at least 1 between them, (ii) and such that, during dispersal, C 0 and the C ij all end up in k pairwise different fragments.
First block:
for each block C i , i = 1, . . . , n do 4: Disperse shares of the block C 0 over k different fragments 3:
Disperse C i to fragment F j , j = i (mod k) Figure 3 : Pseudo-code of the function dispersing the transformed ciphertext CIP H over k fragments
Pseudo-code of the inverse transform ReconstructCAON is presented in Figure 2 . It starts after the ciphertext CIP H was reassembled from the k fragments. First, C0 is obtained by exclusive-oring C 0 with the k − 1 special blocks. Remaining blocks are then reconstructed by exclusive-oring each block with its already recovered predecessor Ci = C i + Ci−1 starting from i = 1.
Similarities with Bastion
The Bastion scheme is similar to the CAON. However, it applies a different AONT over the encrypted data. Here, (pseudo-code presented in Figure 4) , each of the ciphertext blocks Cj is exclusive-ored with all other p ciphertext blocks (and not just its predecessor). Therefore dependencies are created between ciphertext blocks: in particular if an attacker recovers all ciphertext blocks except the first one C 0 (so she learns p blocks), then the scheme is not resistant because she can recover the initialization vector C0, and thus easily win an ind-chosen plaintext game.
This leads the authors of Bastion to specify that the transformed blocks C j of the ciphertext are then dispersed over k fragments in a way that a single fragment does not contain more than p − 2 blocks. From this, the authors of Bastion claim that if an adversary learns only p − 1 blocks (p − 1 = n − 2 in their paper), then she learns no information about the plaintext (we will discuss the security proof in the next section).
So from a cryptographic point of view, the main difference between the specifications of CAON and Bastion (to be formalized in the next section) lies in the objective of resilience to the number of fragments that an attacker can corrupt. From a naive linear algebra point of view (linear independence of a Ci from p − 1 output blocks C k ), Bastion should resist an attacker able to obtain p − 1 ciphertext blocks. CAON relaxes this specification and considers a fixed number k of fragments, independent of the data's size p + 1 (thousands of ciphertext blocks, usually). The aim of CAON is to protect data unless all but one k − 1 fragments are compromised. The use case is that data is dispersed over a limited number k of storage places (a realistic assumption is that the maximum number of fragments is around 20-30 [16] ). Also, a realistic assumption is that once an attacker compromises a storage server containing a fragment, they are able to acquire all the blocks inside of this fragment, which is why we talk in terms of compromised fragments (and not compromised blocks, as in Bastion). Compute the exclusive-all of all the blocks (SU M ):
Exclusive-or the SU M with each of the blocks:
for each block C i , i = 0, . . . , p do 5: 
Some remarks on similarities between Bastion and CAON
Notice that the choice of CTR mode for CAON facilitates the security analysis, and also the comparison with Bastion's scheme. But we will also discuss in §4.2.3 how the Cipher Block Chaining CBC could strengthen the security properties.
Remark 1 (Hand-waving on the security properties). Notice that, when looking at the linear transform just from a naive linear algebra perspective, its structure (a kind of circular chaining) makes the reconstruction of any block Ci, i ≥ 1 require the knowledge of every blocks C j , j = 1 . . . i plus the special blocks C 0 and C i j , which are in k different locations. So from the same reasoning leap as in the proof of Bastion, we could justify as well the resilience of CAON when k − 1 fragments are discovered.
Remark 2 (Exclusive-or of two blocks in Bastion's scheme). In Bastion's scheme, the exclusive-or of two transformed blocks is equal to the exclusive-or of the corresponding ciphertext blocks:
Remark 3 (More similarities between the Bastion and the CAON). F is a fragment containing f = c k
(f is the size of the fragment in blocks) consecutive transformed ciphertext blocks obtained using the Bastion's scheme: F = C i , C i+1 , . . . , C i+f −1 , C i+f . The fragment is transformed in a way that each two consecutive blocks inside it are exclusive-ored:
Applying the Remark 2 we obtain: F = Ci ⊕Ci+1, Ci+1 ⊕Ci+2, . . . , C i+f −1 ⊕C i+f . Fragment F is equivalent to a chain of f consecutive transformed ciphertext blocks inside of the CAON scheme. The difference between the two schemes lies then solely in way of management of the first block CO: in Bastion's scheme all the blocks are required to reconstruct it and in CAON only k selected blocks.
Comparison with relevant works
We compared CAON with relevant works in terms of amount of computations and ability to protect against key exposure. Results of the comparison are shown in Table 1 . As a baseline, we use CTR encryption that requires c − 1 block cipher operations and c − 1 exclusive-or operations. Rivest's and Desai's transforms use encryption during their AONT preprocessing step. Thus, the complete AON processing composed of AONT and actual encryption doubles (Desai) or triples (Rivest, as the hash of data is computed) the number of block ciphers operations in comparison to normal data encryption. Differently, Bastion scheme applies only a linear transform over the encrypted data without increasing the number of block cipher operations. Bastion's transform uses 2c exclusive-or operations. Counting with the encryption step, Bastion scheme requires 3c−1 exclusive-ors. Similarly to Bastion, CAON applies only a linear transform on the ciphertext. However, its transform uses only c + k − 2 exclusive-ors (almost half the amount of Bastion's transform as k is usually a small number). This results in a total of 2c + k − 3 exclusive-ors. Rivest and Desai AONTs do not protect against key exposure. An attacker possessing the key is able to decrypt the transformed data. AONs encrypt data already pre-processed with AONT making them resistant to key exposure unless the random key used during the pre-processing is also being exposed. Bastion protects transformed ciphertext against key exposure unless all but two blocks are being exposed. CAON protects data against key exposure unless all the k fragments are being exposed. 
Performance results
Implementation details: Relevant algorithms were implemented using the same programing style in JAVA with JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-based PC running on Intel R Core TM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. Standard javax.crypto library was used. A random data sample was used for each measurement and each presented result is an average of 30 measurements. AES-CTR-128 was used as the algorithm for symmetric encryption. AES-NI was enabled. Results are somewhat consistent with those presented in [11] when taking into account the difference between AES and AES-NI (factor of 3 in performance) as well as differences between hardware platforms.
Results of the performance comparison are presented in Figure 5 . CAON is the fastest of the four schemes protecting encrypted data against key exposure. Protection against key leakage is achieved with an overhead of only 7% against a simple data encryption. The second fastest scheme, Bastion, results in an overhead of around 19% in comparison to data encryption. We believe that a fine-grained implementation of CAON could make its overhead negligible.
This paragraph aims at proving the (k − 1)-CAKE security CAON by following the same steps and assumptions than the proof presented in the Bastion's paper [11, Lemma 3] as both schemes shares multiple similarities. Lemma 1. Given any k − 1 fragments of F0, . . . , F k−1 as output by CAON, it is infeasible to compute any C i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ c − 1.
Proof. The proof, as done in Bastion's paper [11] Lemma 2, simply expands Remark 1: let us blindly follow [11] . Let F RAG be the result of the whole fragmentation process applied to P LAIN . Note that given the totality of the blocks, the adversary can compute the first block C0 and thus recover first the CIP H and then the plaintext.
[A remark here: contrary to Bastion, she needs only the k − 1 special blocks used to hide the first block C0 plus C 0 , in order to reconstruct C0, and thus winning the game presented above with high probability]. However the special blocks are all in different fragments, so if all but one fragments are given, then the C0 can take any possible values in {0, 1}
|B| , depending on the unknown special block used to hide C0 contained in the missing fragment. Recall that each block Ci is dependent on another block of CIP H and is pseudo-random as output by the CTR encryption mode. Therefore, given only k − 1 fragments, any block Ci contained inside of the fragments could take any of the 2 |B| possibilities.
The end of this quick proof for the (k − 1)-CAKE security of CAON could simply follow [11, Lemma 3] , by simply adapting the linear algebra.
9 Revisiting the assumptions about pseudo-randomness 9.1 When the key is exposed, the output of a blockcipher is not pseudorandom anymore
We revisit now the the proof presented in Section 8 that is based, similarly to Bastion's proof, on the proof of ind-CPA security for the CTR encryption mode. But in the CAKE game, the randomness is not on the key, which is fixed, on the contrary it is on the initialization vector (that is assumed to be unknown to the attacker). Therefore, in a situation of key exposure, it is not true that any distinguisher cannot distinguish the fixed key public blockcipher BC (which they continue to call "pseudo-random permutation"), from a random permutation. Actually, we line up with Katz-Lindell when they notice under their [12, definition 3.25 ], "it is meaningless to say that BC is pseudo-random if the key is known".
Pseudo-randomness issues of the CTR mode in a situation of key exposure
In the particular context, where the key of the blockcipher is known, the output of CTR encryption mode cannot be considered as pseudo-random. This can be shown with an example of an adversary who has only two output blocks of CTR.
Here we bound ourselves to look at the output of CTR from the point of view of an adversary who has only two blocks and the encryption key, and show that it is not pseudo-random. But this is not exactly the case of the Bastion/CAON: actually Bastion/CAON performs linear combinations on this output before giving it to the adversary. So the security of the whole scheme depends, actually, on pseudo-randomness of linear combinations of outputs of CTR, which is a harder problem. We will discuss it in the next section. Consider an adversary A who chooses a plaintext P = [P1, . . . , Pp] and whose goal is to distinguish between CTR encryption and a random function. To make the challenge more difficult, suppose that the adversary is given only two output blocks, of indices i and j (if one of them is zero, then the game is even easier). Call Ci and Cj the corresponding output blocks given by the oracle O to A. If Ci and Cj are true outputs of CTR, then we have
The winning strategy of A is now clear: compute
and compare with i − j: if equal then return "CTR", otherwise return "random". So we have a real problem of pseudo-randomness at the output of CTR when the encryption key is known.
A toy example to understand the problem
As we just saw, public knowledge of the inverse BC −1 makes the output of CTR appear nonrandom. But this may not be a definitive problem: indeed Bastion/CAON doesn't send directly outputs of CTR, but instead linear combinations of them. To understand the problem, let us look at an example called mini-Bastion. Once again, we choose an example for Bastion and not for CAON because the situation is very similar for both schemes -the example for CAON is straightforward once the one for Bastion is presented. Moreover, the CAON algorithm will be extensively discussed in the next sections.
The parameters of mini-Bastion are p = 3 blocks of plaintext, and p + 1 = 4 blocks of output, each of them being a fragment, so there are 4 servers in this scenario (we assume that only one fragment is stored per server). In this tiny model, we consider a static adversary A who is only allowed to learn the p + 1 − 2 = 4 − 2 = two first output blocks C 0 and C 1 . Recall the matrix of the C i in terms of the Ci:
Let us analyze under which condition the view of A is pseudo-random. It is standard that a vector of uniform independent variables transforms itself into a vector of uniform independent variables under a surjective linear transform. So the vector known by the adversary, (C 0 , C 1 ), is indistinguishable from random if and only if it is indistinguishable from random after an invertible transformation. So for our problem is it equivalent to study the vector (C"0, C"1) obtained by the following base change
Now we can write the exact hypothesis needed on BC for this mini-Bastion to resist to this particular adversary (where, morally, C0 is the initialization vector):
Proposition 1 (Nonstandard sufficient hypothesis for 2-CAKE security of miniBastion with a static A). The (publicly computable) random vector in F with independent uniform components. That is, there doesn't exist efficient distinguishers between these two vectors when given polynomial access to random samples of them.
Proof. In CTR mode, when the adversary A chooses two plaintexts P LAIN (a) = (P
3 ), a = 0, 1 in the CPA game, then the random vector received by A from the oracle is
1 ), a = 0 or 1. But whatever (a) is (0 or 1), this vector has a distribution indistinguishable from uniform independent (because equal to a translate of uniform independent). So the adversary has no advantage in the considered game.
Remark 4. We assumed perfectly indistinguishable, but actually a very small distinguishing advantage compared to 2 |B| = 2 128 would be acceptable in practice.
Guaranteeing the security of Bastion/CAON in general
We are going to discuss the case of Bastion, the one of CAON being very similar. Let us recall the matrix of the linear transform of Bastion, here for a CIPH' size of p + 1 = 7:
M at 
The last p−1 columns are separated from the two first to illustrate the view of an adversary who would always asks to see − → C A = (C 2 , . . . , C p ) during the CAKE game. Following remark 2 we will bring down the problem to sums of two or three terms. With the same invertible linear transformation argument as above (with miniBastion), it is equivalent to study pseudo randomness of the new vector −−→ C"A = (C"2, . . . , C"p) defined by the following elementary columns operations between (C"2, . . . , C"p):
so that we obtain the equivalent view: 
. . , C"p). Notice the the situation now is very similar to CAON (after applying 2 to simplify C 0 ). As in miniBastion, the (p-1)-CAKE property against the view of this adversary can then be obtained under the condition that
A is indistinguishable from a random uniform vector. In particular, our linear change simplified the problem because now only sums of two or three terms are involved.
But for the general problem we must consider an adaptative adversary who can choose any (p − 1) uples of columns among p + 1 that he wants to see. So that we end up with asking for a whooping number of p(p + 1)/2 hypotheses:
Proposition 2 (Minimalist sufficient hypothesis for (p-1)-CAKE security of Bastion). For all possible tuples (s, t) of distinct indices in (0, . . . , p + 1) (the two columns that A cannot see, which makes p(p + 1)/2 possibilities depending on his choice) then, fix an index u distinct from s, t (the pivot column: u = 2 in the 7 × 7 example above) then the (publicly computable) random vector in (F |B| 2 ) p−1 defined by:
(where one should read, instead of BC(C0 + 0), just C0), where C0 varies uniformly in F |B| 2 , is polynomially indistinguishable from a random vector of (F |B| 2 ) p−1 with independent uniform components.
The goal of the next paragraphs will be to propose several modifications of CAON, each time in order to rely only on one hypothesis (instead of p(p+1)/2 ), and maybe more commonly accepted.
Formulating more standard cryptographic hypotheses
10.1.1 Secret-sharing the initialization vector C 0 (CAON ssC0 )
As we saw in the previous discussion, the adversary has access to sums of 2 or 3 output blocks of CTR. The goal of this first improvement is to reduce his view to only sums of two output blocs. We modify CAON the following way: the first block C0 containing the Initialization Vector is not protected using already transformed blocks but secret shared: fragmented into k blocks that will be attached to the k fragments. We call this variant CAONssC0. This leads to a storage overhead of size of k − 1 blocks that is negligible for larger data. Concretely, we remove the block C 0 and instead secret-share C0 between the k fragments. Now the matrix of C i≥1 in terms of C i≥0 looks like (e.g. for c = 4): p+1 with independent uniform components.
Proof. The situation is the same as in mini-Bastion. What the adversary receives from O in the CPA game is:
coordinates of: a sample of the random vector −−−→ CssC0, translated (xored) by one A's two chosen plaintexts. So assuming that −−−→ CssC0 has uniform independent components, then the vector received by the adversary also.
A remark on the hypothesis: in particular it implies that the "slopes" of BC in many directions from C0 do not give any information on C0 (the initialization vector).
...And switching to BC a one-way function
Recall that we noticed in §3.2 that public invertibility of BC made the output of CTR mode highly non-pseudo random. So, instead of a publicly invertible permutation, we could pick BC a one-way (still publicly known) function (a hash function is difficult to invert for everyone, also the attacker). This is not usual but not forbidden: as Katz-Lindell point on the page 92, in CTR mode, BC needs not be invertible, nor even a permutation (it is just here to bootstrap a one time pad).
We stress that CTR mode doesn't change: plaintext blocks are still xored with BC(C0+i), where i corresponds to the block index, to produce the output of CTR, and the same operation is applied to decipher. Then, we suppress the linear transformation: let just say that we pick the identity matrix: and C0 continues to be secret shared. Let us call this variant CAONow, but actually it is now very similar to Krawczyk's "Secret Sharing Made Short" [13] , where the secret sharing of the key is replaced by a secret sharing of C0 (indeed, although Krawczyk doesn't detail his encryption mode, we learned from Ronald Cramer that his original idea was to use CTR).
Proposition 4 (Reasonable (but nonstandard) sufficient hypothesis for CAKE security of CAONow).
where C0 is uniform, is perfectly indistinguishable from a random vector in (F |B| 2 ) p with independent uniform components.
In particular the hypothesis implies that the images of many translates of a given plaintext C0 do not give any information on C0.
Switching to Cipher Block Chaining to bootstrap more randomness CAON CBC
Instead of sticking to the CTR mode, we could use CBC to make the output even more independent from C0. Of course the computations are then slower since we lose the possibility of parallelization of the encryption. Coming back to the situation of §10.1.1, where C 0 was secret-shared but BC is still invertible (necessary in CBC mode), we obtain a scheme called CAONCBC . The sufficient condition under which it is secure is harder to describe because the view of the adversary is not, contrary to CTR mode, a mere translation of a random vector by his chosen input. Instead, the dependence between the view and the chosen plaintext [P1, . . . , Pp] is more intricate. where C0 is uniform, is perfectly indistinguishable from a random vector in (F |B| 2 ) p+1 with independent uniform components.
Let us just give a quick hand-waving ideas on why we deem this hypothesis even more credible than the previous ones. Notice that we can easily accept that all the components of −−−→ CCBC , except possibly the first one, behave as uniform independent. Indeed it is commonly accepted that the entropy produced by CCBC grows very quickly. More precisely, a small variation of the chosen plaintext P1 has very quickly uncontrollable effects on the next blocks, due to the recursive calls to BC. So, that we are brought down to believe that the first block is uniform and independent from the next ones, which looks like a very credible assumption for a not too badly chosen permutation BC.
In this paper we introduce the Circular All-Or-Nothing (CAON): a new scheme for protection of encrypted data against key exposure that combines an all-or-nothing processing with data fragmentation. It achieves the (k − 1) fragments -Ciphertext Access under Key Exposure security property: it resists an attacker able to compromise all but one of the sites storing the fragments. A complexity comparison and a performance benchmark demonstrate that CAON is the fastest among relevant works.
We provide an extended security analysis of the proposed scheme. More precisely, we demonstrate that the output of the CTR encryption cannot be considered as pseudo-random while the encryption key is known. Therefore, we investigated the underlying potential security weaknesses and drew a minimal sufficient additional cryptographic hypothesis to guarantee security of the CAON (that works also for Bastion). At this stage, we conclude that both schemes, Bastion and CAON could be used as first presented, if it was known for true that many linear combinations (of two or three terms) of ciphertext blocks encrypted using the CTR mode are apparently independent and uniformly distributed for an adversary who has access to the encryption key.
Finally, we study various possible improvements to CAON to rely on more relaxed or standard cryptographic hypotheses. Especially, we demonstrate that applying secret sharing to the initialization vector and applying the CBC mode of operation instead of the initially proposed CTR mode, allows to rely on a more credible cryptographic assumptions (while not compromising too much on the fragmentation performance).
